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Swimming Against the
Deregulatory Tide: Maintaining
Fixed Prices in Public Offerings
of Securities Through the NASD
Antidiscounting Rules
Harry S. Gerla*
Increasing pressure from institutional investors during the last
two decades has led to indirect discounting practices that some com-
mentators contend threatens the fixed price offering system. In re-
sponse to this concern the SEC in 1980 approved new NASD rules
designed to bar direct or indirect discounting in fixed price public of-
ferings of securities. In this Article Professor Gerla argues that the
SEC erred in approving the new NASD rules. Professor Gerla states
that the new rules change drastically the Commission's policy that the
fixed price system operate without direct or indirect government en-
forcement. Further, he contends that the SEC approved the rules
without empirical data sufficient to support arguments on either side.
Professor Gerla concludes that the rule changes will encourage ineffi-
ciency in the investment banking industry and that the Commission's
policy shift on the role of government in enforcing anticompetitive
agreements in effect has allowed the reregulation of the underwriting
industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or
SEC) recently approved a proposed rule change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD)' designed to elimi-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton; J.D., 1975, Ohio State University.
The author was a staff attorney at the Securities Exchange Commission and worked on the
NASD antidiscounting rules while at the Commission. The views presented here do not re-
present those of the Commission.
1. The NASD is the sole national securities association registered pursuant to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976). The NASD is a membership
organization that regulates primarily the nonexchange securities business of its members.
Although membership in the NASD is not mandatory, virtually every significant broker-
dealer participating in underwriting offerings belongs to the NASD because the organiza-
tion's rules forbid members from selling securities to nonmember broker-dealers except at
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nate direct or indirect discounting in fixed price public offerings of
securities.' Although the question whether the NASD should be
permitted to bar indirect discounting in fixed price offerings may
seem to be of limited import and of interest only to persons in the
underwriting field, approval of the antidiscounting rules has broad
implications for the role of government in enforcing arguably an-
ticompetitive agreements.
This Article postulates that the Commission erred in approv-
ing the NASD antidiscounting rules because the rules are inconsis-
tent with the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act).3 Although the actual impact of the rules may be
slight-because of a Commission-created loophole and enforce-
ment problems 4-the Commission's approval of the rules nonethe-
less may portend serious harm to future competition in the securi-
ties markets. In approving the NASD rules the Commission
reversed a policy of thirty-five years standing" and allowed the use
of governmental power to support agreements designed to frustrate
free market forces. The Commission in the process, uncritically ac-
cepted many of the traditional arguments made on behalf of gov-
ernmental economic regulation of industry and on behalf of price
fixing among competitors. In effect, the Commission sanctioned
the reregulation of the underwriting industry, a development that
in the long run may prove to be the principal harm engendered by
SEC approval of the antidiscounting rules.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fixed Price Offering System
The syndicate system of underwriting, in which a group of in-
vestment bankers forms an underwriting syndicate that acts as a
middleman in distributing the securities of an issuer to the invest-
ing public,6 has been the predominant mode of publicly distribut-
the price offered to the general public. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III § 25, reprinted
in NASD MAN. (CCH) T 2175. Section 15A(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3(e) (1976), specifically sanctions this rule as a method of inducing broker-
dealers to join a registered national securities association.
2. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III §§ 8, 24, 36, reprinted in NASD MAN. (CCH)
11 2174, 2196; see In re National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 17371, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,705 (Dec. 12, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Approval Release].
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
6. Approval Release, supra note 1, at 83,3849-50; see G. ROBINSON & K. EPPLER, 1
[Vol. 36:9
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ing new issues of conventional debt and equity securities since the
end of World War I. The underwriter's profit in this system is the
difference between the price that is paid to the issuer and the price
at which the securities are sold to the public, a difference known as
the "spread." In a "firm commitment offering" the investment
bankers place their capital at risk by making an outright purchase
of the securities from the issuer." A group of broker-deal-
ers-known as the "selling group"-assist the underwriters by act-
ing as agents in retailing the securities to the public. Because they
are acting as agents in the distribution, selling group members in
theory do not place their capital at risk. The selling group mem-
bers make their profit on the selling group spread-the difference
between what is paid to the underwriters and the public offering
price." A salient feature of both the underwriting agreement, which
defines the rights and obligations of the underwriters inter se, and
the selling group agreement, which defines the rights and obliga-
tions between the underwriters and the selling group members, is
the requirement that all participants in the distribution sell the
securities to public investors only at the fixed public offering price
that is stated in a statutorily mandated prospectus. 10 The under-
writers in effect have established a system of resale price mainte-
nance in the public distribution of securities. Under this system
the price per share or unit of securities is the same whether the
purchaser buys 100 or 100,000 shares or units.
Until the 1960's the fixed price underwriting system proved to
be remarkably durable, surviving the Great Depression, several de-
clared and undeclared wars, numerous recessions, and a deter-
mined challenge by the Justice Department under the federal anti-
trust laws.11 The increased importance of institutional investors
since the mid-1960's, however, has threatened to undermine the
fixed price system.12 Institutional investors such as bank trust de-
partments, pension funds, insurance companies, and investment
companies frequently engage in block transactions for their securi-
GOING PUBLIC 1 22, at 94-96 (1978).
7. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,849-50; see United States v. Morgan, 118 F.
Supp. 621, 641-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
8. G. ROBINSON & K. EPPLER, supra note 6, 1 37.
9. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,850; G. ROBINSON & K. EPPLER, supra note 6,
37.
10. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,850; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURIMES
RzGULATION: CASES AND MATzRLS 643 (4th ed. 1980).
11. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
12. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,851, 83,870.
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ties portfolios that may involve thousands of shares of equity se-
curities or hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in
debt securities.
This growth of institutional investors has had a number of sig-
nificant effects on the securities markets. For example, this growth
hastened, if not in large part caused, the demise of fixed rates of
commission on securities exchanges. Until May 1, 1975, all the ma-
jor stock exchanges maintained fixed minimum rates of commis-
sion for most transactions based upon the rate for round lot-100
shares-transactions. 3 Thus, the minimum rate for a 100,000
share transaction was simply one thousand times the minimum
rate for a 100 share transaction. Large transactions of institutional
investors were particularly profitable for brokers because the costs
associated with such transactions were not significantly higher
than those associated with smaller transactions. ' Institutional in-
vestors, however, naturally were dissatisfied with a system that
forced them to pay the same per share rate of commission as a
small individual investor. Institutional investors, therefore, began
to seek reductions in the minimum commission rates from brokers.
The brokers could not openly give institutions rates lower than the
minimums set by the exchanges without risking disciplinary action
by the exchanges."' On the other hand, the brokers could not af-
ford to lose the lucrative business provided by institutional inves-
tors."' To avoid this dilemma, brokers and institutions circum-
vented the exchanges' minimum fixed commission rates by
devising methods with exotic names such as the "give up ''17 and
13. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON SECURI-
TIES, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., SECURITIES INDUSTRY (INITIAL REPORT) 53 (Comm. Print 1972)
[hereinafter cited as SEcURTrrIEs INDUSTRY STUDY]; C. WELLEs, THE LAST DAYS OF THE CLUB
(1975). In April 1971 the exchanges, at the direction of the Commission, allowed negotiated
rates on portions of orders exceeding $500,000. The $500,000 "break point" was lowered to
$300,000 in April 1972. Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 11,203 (Jan. 23, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
80,067 at 84,968-69 [hereinafter cited as SEC Release].
14. SECURITIEs INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 13, at 53.
15. Id.
16. C. WELLE S, supra note 13, at 67.
17. New York Stock Exchange rules allow members of the Exchange to share the com-
missions earned on a transaction. Although members ordinarily share commissions with
other members that work on a trade, the rules permit sharing at the direction of the cus-
tomer with a firm that had no connection with the trade. This customer directed "give up"
became a method of indirect discounting that large mutual funds used to reward other bro-




"end run""' and the "incorporated deep pocket give up."'19 Use of
these devices had become so pervasive by the early 1970's that, as
far as institutional investors were concerned, the exchanges' mini-
mum commission rates were virtually nonexistent. As one com-
mentator notes, institutional pressure made minimum fixed com-
mission rates a dying institution long before the SEC formally
barred them. 0
In light of this background, some institutional investors not
surprisingly began to seek discounts in fixed price offerings of se-
curities. These institutions insisted that the underwriters or selling
group members reduce the spread on transactions. Underwriters
and selling group members generally could not afford to forego the
business provided by institutional investors. Moreover, an institu-
tional investor's willingness to buy part of a new issue could mean
the difference between a successful offering and the ultimate
nightmare of all underwriters-having to absorb part of an issue.2 1
Just as brokers could not openly evade the exchanges' mini-
mum commission rates, underwriters and selling group members
seeking to give discounts to institutional investors for different rea-
sons could not overtly violate their price maintenance agreements.
The underwriting agreements or selling group agreements do not
prevent open discounting; any suit against an open discounter for
breach of contract is likely to fail either for lack of proof of dam-
ages or on antitrust grounds.2 Further, the threat of sanctions by
the NASD was ineffectual in preventing open discounting; at least
until the recent Commission approval of the NASD proposed rule
18. The "end run" was a method that allowed firms to give up portions of commissions
to other firms that were not members of the New York Stock Exchange. A customer would
pay full commission to his Exchange firm, which would then execute the order or another
order on a regional exchange of which the broker-dealer who was the customer-directed
recipient of the give up was also a member. The Exchange firm could then give a portion of
the commission on the transaction to that designated broker-dealer. Id. at 605.
19. The "incorporated deep pocket give up" occurred when institutional investors in-
corporated subsidiaries and registered these subsidiaries as regional broker-dealers. Thus,
indirect discounts through "give ups" and "end runs" came directly back into the institu-
tion's pocket. Id. at 606.
20. C. WELLES, supra note 13, at 67, 85.
21. Proposed Rule Change by the NASD: Papilsky Hearings Before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, File No. 4-282, at 753 (1979) (Testimony of John C. Whitehead, Co-
Chairman, Management Committee, Goldman, Sachs & Co.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
Transcript].
22. Moreover, even assuming damages could be proven, the pursuit of discounters
through litigation probably would be uneconomical. NASD Letter of Comment to George
Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, File No. SR-NASD-78-3, at 18 (August 10, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as NASD Comment Letter].
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change, the NASD did not have the authority to punish dis-
counters."3 Instead, the realization that any firm which openly en-
gages in discounting in a fixed price offering probably would be
excluded from future underwriting syndicates and selling groups
prevented most open discounting.24
To avoid the loss of institutional business or exclusion from
participation in future distributions, some underwriters and selling
group members have resorted to variations on the old techniques
for evading fixed commission rates to give indirect discounts to in-
stitutional investors. Two techniques that seem to be particularly
prevalent are the "designated order" and the "overtrade." In the
designated order a broker will supply an institutional investor with
free goods or services such as research on securities.2 In return,
the institutional investor contacts the managing underwriter of a
new issue that the investor is interested in purchasing and asks
that the broker supplying the goods or services be included in the
selling group and credited with the sale of the securities to the in-
stitutional investor. The broker receives the selling group spread
and the institutional investor receives the securities at the public
offering price and whatever the broker has supplied, which consti-
tutes the indirect discount.2 6 The second method of indirect dis-
counting is the overtrade. An institutional investor wishing to
23. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
24. The Commission in National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945), noted the
use of exclusion from underwriting and selling groups as a deterrent to discounting. The
Commission stated that "[clivil liability for the breach of contract, or the unfavorable opin-
ions of leading underwriters, are among the risks that group members have always faced
when underselling." Id. at 445. Of course, if the exclusion involves any form of concerted
action, it likely would constitute a group boycott, which is a per se violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959). If, however, the NASD imposed the exclusionary action pursuant to self-regula-
tory rules approved by the SEC, the actions likely would be immune from antitrust scrutiny
under the principles established in United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422
U.S. 694 (1974) (certain vertical and horizontal restrictions of NASD immune from antitrust
liability under Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -22f (1976), and the
Maloney Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976)). During the hearings the NASD indicated
that it was concerned not only with a possible attack on the fixed price agreements as price
fixing, but also with an attack on informal enforcement of the agreements as a group boy-
cott. Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 107 (testimony of R. Garrett, Jr.).
25. The broker most typically provides the institutional investor with free research,
but brokers in the past have supplied everything from Christmas cards and "ticker tape
neckties" to computer services. C. WELLES, supra note 13, at 69-70; Loomis, Paulette Papil-
sky's Deadly Threat to Wall Street, FORTUNE, April 23, 1979, at 90, 92.
26. Practices in Fixed Price Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 15807, [1979 Trans-




purchase a new issue at times does not have cash available to make
the purchase or is unwilling to pay cash. Thus, an underwriter
often will take in trade securities currently in the portfolio of the
investor in return for the new issue of securities. This proce-
dure-called a "swap"-easily can include an indirect discount.
Assume, for example, that an institutional investor wishes to
purchase debt securities of Company A with a public offering price
of $100,000. An underwriter could take in trade securities whose
market value is $98,000, thus yielding to the institutional investor
a $2,000 indirect discount on the securities in distribution. This
type of swap is an overtrade. 7
A third type of indirect discounting that is not used presently
is the "recapture." Under this technique an institutional investor
will establish a broker-dealer subsidiary, and the subsidiary will
join the NASD. The institutional investor then will contact the
managing underwriter of a new issue that the institution wishes to
purchase and ask that the institution's broker-dealer subsidiary be
included in the selling group for that issue. The institution then
purchases the securities in distribution through its subsidiary at
the full public offering price. The subsidiary receives the selling
group spread from the transaction. Since the parent institution
eventually receives the profits of the broker-dealer subsidiary, this
recapture yields an indirect discount to the institution.2 8
The frequency of utilization of these indirect discounting de-
vices is a matter in sharp dispute.29 For at least a short time after
the decision in Papilsky v. Berndt,30 which triggered the proposed
rule changes by the NASD, more widespread use of indirect dis-
counting devices appeared likely. In Papilsky a shareholder of an
investment company brought a derivative suit against the invest-
ment advisor-manager of the company. The shareholder charged
that the manager had failed to inform the outside directors of the
investment company of the possibility of utilizing the recapture
technique to benefit the fund.3 1 The advisor-manager claimed that
27. Id.
28. For a more detailed description of the techniques of recapture, see Papilsky v.
Berndt, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,627 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,848.
29. See Loomis, supra note 25, at 90, 92. Compare Hearings Transcript, supra note
21, at 25 (testimony of R. Garrett, Jr.) (discounting not widespread) with id. at 571-721
(testimony of P. McCarthy, President, McCarthy, Reid, Crisanti & Maffei, Inc.) (discounts
are widespread).
30. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 95,267 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
31. Id. at 90, 122.
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section 24 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice prohibited recap-
ture.3 2 The court rejected this defense and held that "in the ab-
sence of a Commission or NASD rule to the contrary" recapture
was both legal and available. The court concluded that failure of
the managers to bring the possibility of recapture to the attention
of the independent directors of the fund constituted a breach of
the managers' fiduciary duties.3
The decision in Papilsky caused great concern among manag-
ers of institutional investors. Some of these managers, however,
noted the "in the absence of an NASD rule to the contrary" lan-
guage in the opinion and wrote to the NASD requesting its formal
opinion on whether recapture was allowable under section 24. s'
The NASD replied that it interpreted section 24 as forbidding re-
capture. 35 This correspondence came to the attention of the Com-
mission, which informed the NASD that, in the Commission's
opinion, this interpretation was, in fact, a change in the NASD
rules.38 Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act 37 requires that virtually
all rule changes of a self-regulatory organization, such as the
NASD, be filed with the Commission and that the changes cannot
take effect until approved by the Commission. The Commission
can grant approval only upon an affirmative finding that the pro-
posed change is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange
Act.38 At an open meeting of the Commission a number of Com-
missioners expressed concern that allowing other means of indirect
discounting would be inequitable if the NASD prohibited
recapture.3 9
In response, the NASD submitted a formal proposed rule
change that barred all of the previously described indirect dis-
32. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 24, reprinted in NASD MAN. (CCH) 5
2175 (1967).
33. Papilsky v. Berndt, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,627,
at 90,130-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
34. Practices Release, supra note 26, at 81,760. An ironic sidelight of the controversy
over indirect discounting is that the precipitating cause of the controversy, the decision of
the district court in Papilsky v. Berndt, has become moot after the decision of the Second
Circuit in the case of Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
934 (1977). The Tannenbaum court reaffirmed the duty of the advisor of a mutual fund to
inform the independent directors of the possibility of recapture, but also held that the ac-
tual decision on whether to use the technique was committed to the informed discretion of
the directors. Id. at 417.
35. Practices Release, supra note 26, at 81,760-61.
36. Id. at 81,761.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1976).
38. Id. § 78s(b)(2).
39. Practices Release, supra note 26, at 81,761; Loomis, supra note 25, at 94.
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counting practices.40 After extensive public hearings on the propos-
als, the Commission suggested two changes in the proposed rule
change. The first change would allow designated orders in return
for research; the second would tighten the provisions barring over-
trades. 41 The NASD incorporated these suggested changes, and the
Commission approved the amended rules. This Article posits that
the Commission erred in approving the new NASD antidiscounting
rules for two reasons. First, the Commission could not have found
on the record that the proposed rule changes were consistent with
the Exchange Act. Second, the approval of the changes places gov-
ernmental enforcement behind facially anticompetitive agree-
ments.
III. THE NASD RULES AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Section 15A(b)(6) of the Exchange Act 42 requires that the
rules of a registered national securities association, of which the
NASD is the sole example, carry out certain enumerated purposes,
and it prohibits rules that have certain effects. Specifically, the
rules of the NASD must
not [be] designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers,
brokers, or dealers, to fix minimum profits, to impose any schedule or fix
rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged by
its members, or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this chap-
ter matters not related to the purposes of this chapter or the administration
of the association.""
Subsection (b)(9) of section 15A also requires that "[tihe rules of
the association do not impose any burden on competition not nec-
essary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of [the Ex-
change Act]. 44
Opponents to the NASD rule changes argued that the propos-
als to limit indirect discounting in fact do impose a schedule or fix
rates of commissions, allowances, or discounts among members
and, thus, that they contravene section 15A(b)(6) of the Exchange
Act. To rebut this point, the NASD claimed that the underwriters,
rather than the NASD, actually fixed the rates and that the sole
function of the NASD in the matter was to enforce the contracts
40. Practices Release, supra note 26, at 81,761.
41. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,853, 83,856-57.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1976).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(9)(1976).
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voluntarily entered into by its members."5 The Commission had re-
jected this very argument thirty-five years earlier in In re National
Association of Securities Dealers (PSI).46 In PSI the Commission
stated:
We cannot accept the NASD's argument that the rule does not "impose"
the schedule of prices and discounts on the member. True, the schedule has
been accepted by the member for the purposes of his contract, but associa-
tion rules impose duties to the association over and above the member's du-
ties which arise out of his dealings with others. Thus, the duty of a member
to deal honestly with a customer has properly been made a multiple obliga-
tion, for which the member may be called to account not only by the cus-
tomer, in civil litigation, but also by the association, in disciplinary proceed-
ings under its rules, as well as by other law-enforcement authorities. So here,
the NASD seeks to impose on participating members an obligation to itself,
enforceable through disciplinary proceedings, to adhere to a schedule of dis-
counts which would otherwise be enforceable only by the parties to the con-
tract through private litigation or such practical economic sanctions as they
might have at their command. And clearly, by the implicit threat of again
using its disciplinary powers, it seeks prospectively to impose on participating
members a schedule of discounts that may be established by contract in any
future underwritings.
Whether or not the PSI syndicate agreements were voluntarily adopted,
and whether or not the minimum profits and schedule of prices and discounts
were "fixed" by the agreements, it is the NASD which is seeking to enforce
the schedule, and thus to "impose" it and other similar schedules by its ap-
plication of the rule in disciplinary proceedings.4 7
The Commission's point was valid in 1945, and it is valid today. In
fact, the NASD in setting forth its proposed rule changes expressly
argued that, but for the weight of NASD enforcement, underwrit-
ers and selling group members eventually would disregard the
price fixing terms of underwriting contracts, and the fixed price
underwriting system would collapse." Thus, the NASD contra-
dicted its own argument when it took the position that the under-
writers rather than the NASD were fixing rates of commissions,
allowances, or discounts under the new proposals.
Despite these inconsistencies the Commission indicated that it
was sympathetic to the NASD position and that it did not wish to
give a "broad" reading to the "fix rates of commissions" language
of section 15A(b)(6) of the Exchange Act.49 The Commission, how-
ever, did not rest its decision that the NASD proposed rule
45. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 46.
46. 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945). For a detailed analysis of PSI, see infra notes 122-39 and
accompanying text.
47. 19 S.E.C. at 437-38 (emphasis in original).
48. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 2-3.
49. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,865.
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changes were not in contravention of the rate fixing prohibitions of
section 15A on those grounds, but instead chose to rely upon sec-
tion 15A(b)(9). The Commission maintained that Congress in-
tended that subsection (b)(9), which was added to section 15A by
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,.0 would provide the sole
criterion for judging proposed rule changes that might have an an-
ticompetitive impact.51 The SEC held that if the benefits of the
change in furthering the purposes of the Exchange Act outweighed
any anticompetitive effects, the proposed change would satisfy sec-
tion 15A even if it violated a specific prohibition contained in sec-
tion 15A(b)(6).52 The Commission cited no authority for this re-
markable proposition. 3
The position taken by the Commission on the relationship be-
tween sections 15A(b)(6) and 15A(b)(9) of the Exchange Act at
best is strained. The Commission in its interpretation not only ig-
nores the plain language of section 15A(b)(6), but also disregards
generally recognized principles of statutory interpretation. The
Commission's view that section 15A(b)(9) overrides the specific
prohibitions of section 15(A)(b)(6) suggests that in enacting the
former section Congress impliedly repealed the prohibitions in the
latter section. An elementary principle of statutory interpretation
is that one section of a statute should not be read to render an-
other section nugatory. 4 The Commission's interpretation ignores
the clear prohibitions in section 15A(b)(6) or, at most, accords
them the status of exhortatory guidelines. Yet, the Commission
specifically stated that the positive requirements for the NASD
rules contained in section 15A(b)(6) retain their vitality.55 The
Commission failed to explain on what basis it concluded that Con-
gress wished to repeal impliedly only certain selected portions of
that section. In addition, the Commission's position that the gen-
eral language of section 15A(b)(9) controls over the specific
prohibitions in section 15A(b)(6) defies the principle that specific
language in a statute controls over general language.56 According to
traditional techniques of statutory interpretation, the Commission
should have read sections 15A(b)(6) and (9) in pari materia as say-
50. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
51. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,866.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See 1A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.10 (4th ed. 1974).
55. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,866 n.98.
56. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 54, § 51.05.
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ing that while all proposed rule changes by the NASD must meet a
balancing test weighing the anticompetitive effects of the proposal
with the benefits in carrying out the purposes of the Exchange Act,
proposed rule changes that fall within the specific prohibitions
enumerated in section 15A(b)(6) are per se inconsistent with the
Exchange Act.57 Under this interpretation the Commission should
have disapproved the proposed NASD antidiscounting rules on the
ground that they amounted to a fixing of comissions in violation of
section 15A(b)(6).
The Commission's finding that the NASD proposals are con-
sistent with section 15A is not justifiable even if one accepts the
Commission's strained reading of that section. The claims by the
NASD that its ban on indirect discounting would further the pur-
poses of the Exchange Act are either irrelevant or insufficiently
proven. Moreover, the modifications of the proposals insisted upon
by the Commission are inconsistent with the justifications for the
antidiscounting rules advanced by the NASD and other propo-
nents of the changes. 8
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NASD PROPOSALS
The anticompetitive effects of the NASD prohibition of indi-
rect discounting on fixed price offerings are readily apparent; the
admitted purpose of the antidiscounting rules was to insulate un-
derwriters and selling group members from the competitive pres-
sures exerted by institutional investors. 9 The proposals prevent
underwriters or selling group members in fixed price underwritings
from selling new issues to institutional investors at a price deter-
mined by free bargaining between the buyer and seller.6 0 It could
57. This position is essentially the one taken by Commissioner Evans in dissent. See
Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,876 (Evans, Comm'r, dissenting).
58. Other proponents of the NASD antidiscriminating rule included the Securities In-
dustry Association (SIA) and a significant number of individual broker-dealers as well as
issuers of securities. E.g., Letter of Comment from E.F. Hutton & Co. to George A. Fitzsim-
mons, Secretary, SEC, File No. SR-NASD-78-3 (November 15, 1979); Letter of Comment
from International Paper Co. to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, File No. SR-
NASD-78-3 (January 14, 1980); Letter of Comment from Mobil Corp. to George A. Fitzsim-
mons, Secretary, SEC, File No. SR-NASD-78-3 (January 18, 1980); Letter of Comment from
Securities Industry Association to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, File No. SR-
NASD-78-3, (July 31, 1979) [hereinafter cited as SIA Comment Letter].
59. Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 26 (testimony of R. Garrett, Jr.) (defending
the proposed rules as "[tihe principal bulwark of the well-intentioned [NASD] member
against the pressures of his economically more powerful institutional customer").
60. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,873-74 (Evans, Comm'r, dissenting); cf.
Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 26, 55-56, 105 (testimonies of R. Garrett, Jr. and L.
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be argued that the competitive benefits of the antidiscounting
rules, particularly in terms of the structure of the underwriting in-
dustry may outweigh the obvious anticompetitive effects. One com-
mentator in fact has argued that the antidiscounting rules, on bal-
ance, will be procompetitive in the long run. 1 Nevertheless, the
NASD did not contest seriously the point that the rules would
have anticompetitive effects. The NASD-and ultimately the
Commission-instead chose to emphasize how the antidiscounting
rules would further the purposes of the Exchange Act. Specifically,
the NASD attempted to justify its restraint on competition on
three grounds: the rules were necessary (a) to prevent fraud on in-
vestors; (b) to prevent unfair discrimination between investors;
and (c) to preserve the fixed price offering system and the entire
capital raising system of the United States. This Article addresses
individually each of these justifications.
A. The Prevention of Fraud
The NASD maintained that its antidiscounting rules were
needed to protect investors against fraud. 2 Specifically, the NASD
argued that the failure of issuers and underwriters to disclose the
existence of indirect discounting in the prospectus constituted a
fraud against investors because indirect discounting rendered the
disclosure of the price of the securities in the prospectus false and
misleading." In approving the NASD proposals, the Commission
totally dismissed this justification on the ground that a generalized
disclosure in the prospectus of indirect discounts could cure any
misleading of investors. 4
The issue of disclosure is more complex than the Commission
was willing to admit. As the NASD pointed out, any disclosure of
indirect discounting practices made in the prospectus can only be
extremely general and speculative. The issuer and underwriters
who prepare the prospectus generally are ignorant not only of who
is granting or receiving indirect discounts and the amount of any
such discounts, but also of whether the discounts even exist in the
Hambrecht).
61. Brunelle, The Papilsky Rule and the Emerging Antitrust Dimensions of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 50 (1981); see infra notes 160-78 and accompanying
text.
62. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,867.
63. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 12-13.
64. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,867-68.
1983]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
particular offering. 5 Thus, by stating that some type of vague gen-
eralized disclosure could cure any disclosure problems associated
with indirect discounts, the Commission was positing, in effect,
that persons who prepare the prospectus need only do as best they
can-a view the Commission might not always wish to follow.66
Nonetheless, for the Commission to have held otherwise in this in-
stance would have been surprising. If the Commission had ruled
that a failure to disclose indirect discounts in detail made a pro-
spectus materially misleading, the logical implication would be
that the signers of a large majority of the prospectuses over the
last decade had violated not only sections 11 and 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933,7 but also section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and rule 10b-5 thereunder. 8 Evidence exists that indirect dis-
counting is fairly widespread, particularly in offerings that are sell-
ing slowly,6 9 yet no witness before the Commission or commentator
on the antidiscounting rules was able to point to a prospectus that
disclosed the existence of indirect discounts. The Commission,
therefore, eschewed reliance on the prevention of fraud as a statu-
tory justification for the NASD antidiscounting rules rather than
risk subjecting issuers and underwriters to large civil liabilities for
violations of both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act.
B. The Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Among Investors
Section 15A(b)(6) of the Exchange Act70 prohibits the rules of
the NASD from unfairly discriminating between investors. The
NASD claimed that the existence of indirect discounts discrimi-
nated unfairly against smaller investors who lacked the bargaining
65. Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 12 (testimony of J.S. Putnam, President,
F.L. Putnam & Co., and Chairman of the Board, NASD); cf. NASD Comment Letter, supra
note 22, at 68.
66. As the NASD pointed out, the Commission's General Counsel has taken the posi-
tion that "hedge clauses" in the literature of brokers, dealers, and investment advisors,
which state "that the information furnished is obtained from sources believed to be reliable
but that no assurance can be given as to its accuracy," violate the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities acts when the clauses are "likely to lead an investor to believe that he
has in any way waived any right of action he may have." Opinion of General Counsel, Relat-
ing to Use of "Hedge Clauses" by Brokers, Dealers, Investment Advisors and Others, SEC
Release No. 4593, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 25,095, at 18,207-08 (April 10, 1951).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77q (1976).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5) (1980).
69. See supra note 26; cf. Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 735 (testimony of
J.C. Whitehead) (economic pressure for discounting is very heavy, particularly in declining
market).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1980).
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power of large institutional investors to obtain these discounts.7 '
The NASD also claimed that inequities would result if large inves-
tors were permitted to pay a lower per share price than that paid
by the small investor for new issues of securities. Ray Garrett, Jr.,
a former Chairman of the Commission and special counsel for the
NASD, stated his position during the hearings:
I realize market forces are very popular today but our whole structure is
based to a degree upon prohibiting the rich and popular from taking it out on
the poor. . .. [The NASD antidiscounting rules are] an application of the
same thing. We are saying that this application of the market forces produces
an inequitable result and therefore market forces should be interrupted to
that degree for [the period of the public offering].
71
The Commission chose not to rely on this argument in approv-
ing the proposed rule change.73 Although the Commission probably
was correct in not basing its decision on the argument, the justifi-
cation merits some detailed consideration for two reasons. First,
prior to 1975 the unfair discrimination argument had some strong
historical support. Second, the argument has some interesting par-
allels in deregulation disputes in other regulated industries and in
the arguments made on behalf of price fixing arrangements by
competitors.
In the United States the concept that the government should
regulate an industry to ensure that all buyers pay the same per
unit price regardless of the size of their purchases dates back to
the Grange and Populist movements of the late nineteenth cen-
tury. The early Populists objected to a number of railroad pricing
practices, including the use of secret rebates to grant large shippers
rates more favorable than those given small shippers. 4 The rail-
roads themselves undertook numerous efforts to curb the use of
secret rebates because the rebates produced competition that
eroded profits. 5 The discontent of the small shippers, combined
71. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 13-14.
72. Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 128 (testimony of R. Garrett, Jr.).
73. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,868.
74. See D. HicKs, THE PoPuLsT REVOLT 67-68 (1931). The populists, however, were
not anticompetitive Luddites. Many of the railroad practices that angered the populists
would offend deeply any modern day proponent of free competition. For example, railroads
in the late 19th century often attempted to engage in pooling arrangements, which are sim-
ple price fixing arrangements by competitors. See S. BUCK, THE GRANGER MoVEMENT 12
(1913).
75. For an extensive discussion of the efforts of the railroads to stem the practice of
rebating, see G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 (1965). See also P. MAcAVOY,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION chs. 3-4 (1965) (detailing the effects of "cheating"
on successive rate fixing agreements and railroad profits).
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with the desire of the railroads to avoid competition, led to the ban
on rebates contained in section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act
of 18871 and later to the strengthening of that ban in the Elkins
Act of 1903.Y
The 1930's witnessed a resurgence of populist sentiment in-
spired by the New Deal. What makes the era of the 1930's relevant
is that section 15A of the Exchange Act, including the prohibition
against "unfair discrimination between investors," was a product
of that era. 8 One of the more important tenets of political and
economic faith in the New Deal era was the belief that unbridled
competition was in part responsible for the Great Depression.
Thus, the New Deal witnessed a deemphasis on promotion of free
competition through both the antitrust laws 79 and an emphasis on
industrial cooperation through industrial codes promulgated under
the authority of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).80
These codes reflected a renewed interest in protecting small busi-
nesses from what was viewed as price discrimination through the
grant of discounts to big businesses.8 ' For example, among the
codes promulgated under the NIRA was one devised by the Invest-
ment Bankers Conference, which was a forerunner of the NASD.
The predecessor section to current section 24 of the NASD Rules
of Fair Practice was a provision of the Investment Bankers Code 2
that prohibited the rebating in fixed price offerings of underwriting
spreads or brokerage commissions.
76. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
77. Ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903). The current debate over indirect discounts in under-
writings resembles greatly the controversy over secret railroad rebates in that the NASD
joins the claim that indirect discounting will reduce drastically the profitability of firms in
the underwriting field with expressions of concern for the "small" investor. See infra part
IV(C).
78. The Maloney Act of 1938 added this provision to the original Securities Exchange
Act. Ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938).
79. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); R. POSNER & F.
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUsT: CASES, ECONOMIc NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 126-28 (2d ed.
1981); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST § 66q, at 181 (1977).
80. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
81. F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 10 (1962).
82. NATIONAL REcOVERY ADMINISTRATION, CODE OF FAIR COMPETITION FOR INVESTMENT
BANKERS, Amend. No. 2 art. V §§ 4(a)-(b), reprinted in 8 CODES OF FAIR COMPETITION 672
(1934). At least one goal of the provision was to enforce the ideal of all purchasers paying
the same unit price for securities. As the administrator of the National Recovery Adminis-
tration (NRA) stated in his letter of transmittal to President Roosevelt, "[p]rovisions are
included which will tend to establish one price for all investors irrespective of the size of the
transaction or the importance of the purchase." Letter from Hugh S. Johnson, Administra-
tor, National Recovery Administration, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, (March 23, 1934), re-
printed in 8 CODES OF FAIR COMPETITION 660 (1934).
[Vol. 36:9
NASD RULES
The Supreme Court in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States" declared the NIRA unconstitutional. The movement to
prevent discounts based upon the size of purchases, however, con-
tinued unabated and reached its pinnacle in 1936 with the passage
of the Robinson-Patman Act,8 which amended section 2 of the
Clayton Act. 8 The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was to
prevent price discrimination against small businesses-when the
effect of the discrimination is to injure competition-by prohibit-
ing quantity discounts except as justified by cost savings or meet-
ing competition." The Robinson-Patman Act was a concrete mani-
festation of the populist notion that the "little guy" should pay the
same per unit price as the "big guy."
'87
This background is relevant to the present day NASD propos-
als approved by the Commission because the supporters of the an-
tidiscounting rules could have maintained that Congress in 1938,
in prohibiting the rules of a registered national securities associa-
tion from "unfairly" discriminating between investors, in fact in-
tended that the rules of the association should promote the ideal of
all investors paying the same unit price.8 Under this approach the
NASD could have argued that its new rules on indirect discounting
help avoid "unfair discrimination" by ensuring that the small in-
vestor in a fixed price offering pays the same price for each of his
100 shares as that which the giant institutional investor pays for
each of its 100,000 shares. In fact, the NASD could have pursued
the point even further by pointing out the analogy between its ban
on rebating the underwriting compensation and section 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act89 and section 22(d) of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940.90
83. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) (original version at ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)).
85. Id.
86. J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 67-72 (1976).
87. See F. ROWE, supra note 81, at 19-23; The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy and Law,
1 A.B.A. SEc. ANTITRUST L. REP. 22-24 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Monograph]. See
also E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr PRIMm 9-10 (1970); J. VON KALINOWSKI, 16C
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION § 28.02, at 28-8 to 28-10 (1982); A. NEALE & D. GOYDER,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 212-13 (3d ed. 1980) (all emphasiz-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act's goal of curbing discriminatory prices in favor of large cus-
tomers, particularly chain stores).
88. Cf. Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 46 (testimony of R. Garrett, Jr.) (Con-
gress was concerned about the problem of underpriced shares and favorable prices for large
investors when it passed the Securities Act of 1933).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976) (original version at ch. 592, § 2(c), 49 Stat. 1527 (1936)).




The parallel between the NASD antidiscounting rule and sec-
tion 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act is apparent; both sections
are designed to prohibit the granting of discounts to favored cus-
tomers through "dummy" brokerage commissions. Section 2(c) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits disguised price discrim-
ination through the use of brokerage commissions, states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a
commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount
in lieu thereof except for services rendered in connection with the purchase
of goods, wares, or merchandise. . ..
The new NASD antidiscounting rules attempt to end indirect dis-
counting of designated orders by prohibiting the receipt of broker-
age commissions-either the underwriting or selling group
spreads--"except as consideration for services rendered in
distribution.
'9 2
The parallel between the NASD antidiscounting rules and sec-
tion 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 is even more
striking. Section 22(d), which prohibits the sale of investment com-
pany shares to the public "except... at a current public offering
price described in the prospectus," 93 is a price fixing provision that
requires "retail price maintenance. 9" The explicit purpose of sec-
tion 22(d) was to destroy a two-tiered system of distribution of in-
vestment company securities under which purchasers could pay
less than the ostensible public offering price for investment com-
pany shares by purchasing them from "bootlegging" dealers who
engaged in discounting.9 5 The ideal that all purchasers should pay
the same per unit price in part motivated the adoption of section
22(d); thus, the enactment of that section supports the notion that
Congress in 1938 intended the NASD rules to enforce that same
ideal.
Although possibly valid in 1938, the argument that preventing
"unfair discrimination between investors" means that all investors
pay the same per share price is questionable today because of the
enactment by Congress of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975.98 When the Commission was considering whether to abolish
91. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
92. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,857-58.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1976).
94. D. RATNER, SEcuRrriIS REGULATION IN A NUTSHEL 237 (2d ed. 1982).
95. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 706-10
(1974).
96. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
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stock exchange rules mandating minimum fixed rates of commis-
sion, two principal arguments of the exchanges were: first, that the
fixed rates provided a useful cross-subsidy to small investors; and
second, that requiring all investors to pay the same rate regardless
of bargaining clout was only "fair. '9 7 The Commission rejected
these arguments and abolished fixed minimum rates.98 Congress
ratified the Commission's decision in the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975. Congress in Section 6(e) of the Exchange Act, as
amended, banned fixed commission rates on exchanges unless the
Commission affirmatively found that fixed rates were necessary to
further the purposes of the Exchange Act.99 Thus, Congress implic-
itly approved the Commission's conclusion that considerations of
equity do not demand that all investors pay the same per unit
price.
In addition, the argument that all investors must pay the same
per unit price in public offerings of securities calls for economic
price discrimination against large purchasers. The only meaningful
definition of price discrimination is a difference in the cost/price
ratios for two purchasers. 100 Securities dealers achieve substantial
cost savings in large-scale sales of securities. 01 The actual per unit
cost of the large purchases of institutional investors, therefore, is
significantly lower than the actual cost of the small purchases of
individual investors. Thus, if both the large scale and small scale
investors pay the same per unit price, the system discriminates
against the large investor. To paraphrase what Professor and now
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter wrote in the context of
the debate over fixed commission rates on securities exchanges, the
NASD argument was "essentially an argument in favor of discrimi-
nation: Big, rich institutional investors should pay high-price cost
ratios, and poor, little individual investors should pay low
ratios."1
0 2
Proponents of the antidiscounting rules may argue that no-
tions of fairness and equity justify that large investors pay more
per unit; thus, small investors can pay less per unit. Proponents of
97. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAiRs, SUBCOMMITrEE ON
SzcuRrrnzs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 58-60 (1973). [hereinafter cited as Industry Study].
98. SEC Release, supra note 13 at 84, 981.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e) (1976).
100. See R. WEsT & S. TiNc, THE ECONOMICS OF THE STOCK MARKET 122 (1971); Bax-
ter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. REv. 675,
694-95 (1970).




regulation in other industries have proffered a similar argument,
which is known as a "cross-subsidization" or "internal subsidiza-
tion" argument."' 3 In the telephone industry, for example, the cost
of providing service to rural areas is much higher than the cost of
serving urban areas. Phone rates, however, are based on distance,
the value of the service to the consumer, or statewide averaging
rather than on the actual cost of providing the service.104 Thus,
rural areas do not pay significantly more for their phone service
than urban areas although the costs of providing service to high
density areas are significantly lower than the costs of providing
service to low density areas.10 5 Customers in urban areas, in effect
pay supra-competitive rates to keep rural rates artificially low.
Proponents of continued regulation argue that only through con-
tinued regulation and noncompetitive limited market entry can ur-
ban rates be high enough to maintain rural phone service. 0 6
Trucking and airline deregulation opponents make the same argu-
ment about the relationships between rural and urban areas and
between small shippers and large shippers.1
0 7
Many objections, however, exist to the concept of cross-subsi-
dizing small investors through fixed prices in public offerings.
First, as Alfred E. Kahn points out, cross-subsidies are, in general,
allocatively inefficient; the loss to those providing the subsidy is
greater than the gain to those subsidized. 08 Moreover, unlike a di-
rect subsidy, a cross-subsidy is insulated from the increased scru-
103. See Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 22, 23-24
(1971).
104. AisamcA ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW REFORM 4-5 (1980).
105. Id. at 31-32.
106. See United States v. Am. TeL & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1358 (D.D.C. 1981);
AMERICA ENTERPMSE INSTIrUTE, supra note 104, at 31-32.
107. See, e.g., Economic Regulation of the Trucking Industry: Hearings Before the
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Tranportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 216, 218-19 (state-
ment of the American Trucking Association, Inc.) (deregulation will injure small shippers
and rural areas); Reform of the Economic Regulation of Air Carriers: Hearings Before The
Subcomm. of Aviation of The House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 632-33 (1976) (statement of Paul R. Ignatius, President, Air Transport Asso-
ciation) (restricted entry and rate setting needed to maintain airline service to smaller com-
munities). The trucking associations drew an explicit analogy to "the securities industry
under deregulation" and claimed that just as the "small investor" was paying higher rates
under deregulation, the small shipper would pay increased rates and received poor or nonex-
istent service if trucking were deregulated. Commerce Committee Hearings, supra at 216.
108. 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 191 (1970). But see Posner, supra
note 103, at 41-42 (claiming that while cross subsidies are less efficient than some hypotheti-
cal ideal, they are not necessarily more allocatively inefficient than the real-world alterna-
tives of tax or direct subsidies).
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tiny and give and take of the political process. For example, if tele-
phone service were deregulated and rates to rural areas increased
dramatically, legislators representing rural areas might sponsor a
direct subsidy to allow their constituents to maintain some reason-
able level of telephone service. Rural legislators promoting the leg-
islation then might be disinclined to vote against programs that
subsidize urban dwellers-such as rat eradication, urban housing,
and mass transit programs-for fear that urban legislators would
vote against rural telephone subsidies. Under the current system of
hidden subsidization through regulation the subsidy to rural tele-
phone users remains virtually immune from this political com-
promise. 09
Second, a cross-subsidy argument based upon an equitable no-
tion of assisting the "small" investor makes little sense because an
individual investor may be an extremely wealthy person. 1 0 The
person of limited income, on the other hand, is much more likely
to be involved in the securities markets through pension funds or
insurance policies. Thus, the institutional investor in fact may re-
present the truly small investor."'
Last, the claim that large investors should cross-subsidize
small investors lacks the moral weight that other claims for cross-
subsidies often possess. The proposition that small investors
should be subsidized to enable them to purchase securities does
not seem to be in the same class as claims that persons living in
rural areas should be able to enjoy telephone or transportation ser-
vices, or even that shippers in rural areas should be able to get
their goods to markets at affordable prices. The argument that a
just society should not allow its members in rural areas to be de-
prived of basic telecommunication and transportation services
seems eminently reasonable. In contrast, the argument that a soci-
ety is unjust because it does not allow its less wealthy members to
own debt or equity securities in corporations hardly seems to merit
serious consideration.
109. This statement does not say that direct subsidies are necessarily more visible
than indirect subsidies to the general public. As Professor-now Judge-Posner points out,
legislatures often enact direct subsidies with scarcely any public scrutiny. Id. at 43-44.
Nonetheless, a direct subsidy more easily seems to arouse the general public than does a
hidden subsidy. The divergent degrees of public emotion over welfare payments and truck-
ing regulation are perfect examples of this phenomenon. In addition, direct subsidies are
visible to those directly involved in the political process-such as legislators-and thus are
subject to the normal political processes.




V. ARE ANTIDISCOUNTING RULES NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE
CAPITAL RAISING SYSTEM?
A. The NASD's Claims and Our Current Knowledge
The strongest argument raised by the NASD in support of the
antidiscounting rules-and the argument that the Commission
principally relied upon-was that without the rules the entire fixed
price offering system and the entire American capital raising sys-
tem might collapse. The NASD claimed specifically that without
its new rules an upsurge in indirect discounting would lead to de-
creased willingness on the part of small investors to participate in
public offerings.112 Moreover, the absence of rules against discount-
ing would lead to increased risks for underwriters including a pre-
clusion of successful stabilization,11 s which in turn would increase
the cost of raising capital for issuers.""
The NASD claim about the effects of a failure to approve the
antidiscounting rules on the ability of United States issuers to
raise capital contains the questionable assumption that the col-
lapse of the fixed price underwriting system would be tantamount
to the collapse of the entire capital raising process. As Commis-
sioner Evans in dissenting from the Commission's approval of the
NASD rules asserted, the equation of the health of the fixed price
underwriting system with the well-being of the entire American
capital raising mechanism displays a distinct lack of faith in the
ability of that mechanism to evolve and flourish through competi-
tion.1 15 If the fixed price underwriting system were to collapse
under the pressure of indirect discounting, the system that would
evolve under free competition might be more efficient than the
current system. Indeed, if only quasi-governmental enforcement
can maintain the current fixed price system as the NASD claims,
then perhaps the current fixed price system is inherently ineffi-
cient and should be replaced. Even if the demise of the fixed price
offering system would make capital raising more difficult and ex-
pensive, the issue remains whether indirect discounting actually
will lead to the demise of the system or to the other specific ill
112. See NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 15-17, 24-25; SIA Comment Let-
ter, supra note 58, at 28.
113. Stabilization is the process of effecting purchases for the purpose of retarding a
decline in the price of securities. N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS, & T. Russo, REGULATION OF
BROKERS, DAL.ERs AND SzcuRrms MARKETS 4.01 (1977).
114. SIA Comment Letter, supra note 112, at 27-28.
115. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,877 (Evans, Comm'r, dissenting).
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effects claimed by the NASD and accepted by the Commission.
The NASD and the other supporters of the rule changes pro-
vided only conclusory statements in support of the proposition
that indirect discounting will destroy the American capital raising
system. 116 In fact, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
and other opponents of the proposed antidiscounting rules also
had no factual basis to support their positions because of a general
lack of current empirical data on the workings and economics of
the new issue markets. The problem with documenting how much
indirect discounting currently occurs is an excellent example of
this climate of ignorance. The NASD and the other supporters of
the new rules-notably the Securities Industry Association-claim
that the current fixed price offering system is the best capital rais-
ing system ever devised.11 If indirect discounting is a prominent
feature of the system, then a rule banning discounting would be
superfluous because, in the NASD's and Security Industry Associa-
tion's view, the system is functioning perfectly well. The NASD,
therefore, has maintained that indirect discounting is relatively
uncommon and that only future indirect discounting threatens the
underwriting system. 1 Those who claim that indirect discounting
is currently a widespread phenomenon dispute this view.1 9 No evi-
dence exists in the public record that the Commission investigated
how much indirect discounting occurs before it approved the
NASD rules. The ignorance of the Commission on this matter is
symptomatic of the more general lack of information with which
the Commission considered the new NASD rules-a failing not
only of the Commission but of outside scholars as well.1 20 Although
the Commission now plans to remedy some of the general lack of
knowledge with respect to the securities markets by sponsoring a
series of studies on those markets, including the new issue mar-
116. Id. at 83,874. Even former Commissioner Roberta Karmel, a strong supporter of
the antidiscounting rules, admitted that the hearings were singularly unenlightening. Com-
missioner Karmel writes, "[T]he overarching policy issues were not aired at the public hear-
ings that the Commission held to develop a record for deciding the Papilsky controversy.
Indeed, considering the real drama involved, the hearings were very boring to attend. They
were simply a repeat of legal arguments already in the record." R. KARm0L, REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION 134 (1982).
117. See NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 21; SIA Comment Letter, supra
note 112, at 13.
118. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 20 nn. 14-15; Hearings Transcript,
supra note 21, at 25 (testimony of R. Garrett, Jr.).
119. See supra note 30.




ket, 12 the Commission should have undertaken studies before
making a final decision on the antidiscounting rules.
The Commission and the supporters of the proposed rule
change conceivably could justify their failure to develop any hard
empirical-or even anecdotal-data in support of their claims if
the burden of proof were on those opposing the change or if the
claims put forth by the NASD were self-evident. Neither of those
conditions, however, exists.
B. Burdens of Proof and the Legacy of the PSI Case
Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act requires that the Com-
mission approve a proposed rule change "if it finds that such pro-
posed rule change is consistent with the requirements of [the Ex-
change Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder."' 12 The
section does not indicate who bears the burden of proof to demon-
strate the need for a change. Moreover, the legislative history of
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, which created section
19(b)(2), gives no guidance on the burden of proof question. No
matter what the general rule might be, the burden of proof on the
proposed NASD rule changes should have been assigned to the
NASD because it sought a radical change in the Commission's view
of the role of governmental-or at least quasi-governmen-
tal-authority to enforce agreements designed to frustrate free
market forces.1 23 The Commission advanced this view in PSP24 in
which it stated that while the government should not actively chal-
lenge fixed price agreements in underwritings, those agreements
must stand on their own without governmental support.125
PSI concerned an attempt to distribute thirty-eight million
dollars in bonds issued by the Public Service Company of Indiana
(hence the name PSI). The effective date of the registration state-
ment was December 7, 1939. The outbreak of war in Europe made
the bonds extremely difficult to sell at the fixed public offering
price, and a number of underwriters and selling group dealers be-
gan to sell the bonds at a discount below the public offering price.
The NASD brought disciplinary proceedings against the discount-
ing underwriters during which the NASD found that the under-
121. Publication of Commission Capital Market Working Papers, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 6246, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,663 (Oct. 9, 1980).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2)(B) (1976).
123. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
124. 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945).
125. Id. at 425-31.
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writers had violated section 1 of its Rules of Fair Practice, which
required NASD members to adhere to just and equitable principles
of trade."' 8 The NASD then imposed nominal fines on the under-
writers.1 2 7 On its own motion the Commission brought the discipli-
nary action before it for review.
The Commission in PSI addressed two issues. First, in a seem-
ing exercise in dictum the Commission held that the price mainte-
nance sections of underwriting agreements did not violate section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.12 8 Second, the Commission held that
the NASD disciplinary actions could not stand. The Commission
stated that "a rule specifically requiring adherence to price mainte-
nance agreements would be contrary to section 15A(b)(7)," which
was the predecessor section to present section 15A(b)(6) of the Ex-
change Act. The Commission held that a rule of this type would
contravene section 15A(b)(7) by creating impediments to free and
open markets and by in effect fixing rates of commissions.
12 9
The Commission's decision drew a sharp dissent from Com-
missioner Healy, who expressed puzzlement at how the Commis-
sion could support the fixed price offering system by approving
and regulating the practice of stabilization and at the same time
deny the NASD authority to help preserve the system.130 Commis-
sioner Healy believed that the Commission was ascribing to Con-
gress an irrational intent in enacting section 15A(b)(7). 131 Commis-
126. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. I § 1, reprinted in NASD MAN. (CCH) 12151
at 2014.
127. 19 S.E.C. 424, at 432-33 (1945).
128. Id. at 464.
129. Id. at 443-45.
130. Id. at 488, 495 (Healy, Comm'r, dissenting).
131. Id. (Healy, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Healy expressed amazement at
how the Commission could find the fixed price system necessary for the successful distribu-
tions and a reasonable restraint under the antitrust laws yet at the same time find that the
imposition of sanctions against those who sought to defy the system was an "impediment"
to competition in violation of § 15A(b)(7). As Healy stated:
Although the agreements were necessary and reasonable, and probably not in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act, nevertheless, it is said they were impediments within the
meaning of Section 15A (b) (7) and the NASD cannot discipline those of its members
who violate, without equitable excuse, necessary and reasonable contracts they make
with each other! All three of my associates seem to press for a rigorous construction
and application of the word "impediments". They all seem agreed that the considera-
tions which led the Supreme Court to give a reasonable construction to the Sherman
Act, and to hold that not every restraint in commerce was illegal, are lacking when the
effect of Section 15A (b) (7) on the disciplinary powers of the NASD is reached. I do
not believe that anyone who worked on the Maloney Act,-Senator Maloney, the Con-
gress, the Commission, investment bankers, brokers or dealers,-had the slightest in-
tention of promoting a statute with more rigorous standards than were found in the
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sioner Healy's dissent, however, failed to address the true point of
the opinion, a point that is relevant today. The Commission never
gave, as Commissioner Healy seemed to assume it did, its endorse-
ment to the fixed price underwriting system as an ideal for capital
raising mechanisms. On the contrary, the Commission pragmati-
cally recognized that the fixed price offering system was an institu-
tion that seemed to function efficiently on its own and, thus,
should not be exposed to governmental attacks such as challenges
under the antitrust laws.
1 32
The philosophy underlying PSI also is apparent in United
States v. Morgan.' The court in Morgan, in an opinion by Judge
Medina, dismissed criminal indictments brought by the Govern-
ment against major underwriters. The indictments alleged that the
underwriters willfully violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act by fixing prices through the resale price maintenance clauses
of underwriting agreements.13 4 Scholars rightly have criticized as
fictitious the Morgan court's articulated basis for its deci-
sion-that the underwriters in a public offering are really a single
entity and therefore cannot violate section I of the Sherman
Act.13 5 In fact, underwriters expressly provide in the underwriting
agreements that their liability for the offering shall be individual
rather than joint and several."3 6 Nevertheless, the lengthy opinion
in Morgan contains not only a tone of strong admiration for the
fixed price underwriting system as an efficacious capital raising
system, but also an equally strong disinclination to risk tampering
with that system through the antitrust laws.37 This Article sub-
Sherman Act ....
It seems to me that all statutes, not merely the Sherman Act, should be given a
reasonable construction. I think it is sensible and necessary that Section 15A (b) (7) be
given a reasonable construction. In construing it and applying it, I know of no more
sensible guides than those laid down by the late Justice Brandeis in his splendid opin-
ion in the Chicago Board of Trade case, from which my associates quote.
Id. at 493-94 (Healy, Comm'r, dissenting) (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 469.
133. 118 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
134. Id. at 628.
135. See Brunelle, supra note 61, at 71-72; Note, The Investment Bankers Case: The
Use of Semantics to Avoid the Per Se Illegality of Price Fixing, 63 YALE L.J. 399, 402-03
(1954).
136. See Brunelle, supra note 61, at 71-72; NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at
19 n.13.
137. 18 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Judge Medina's admiration for the fixed price
offering system is exemplified by the following excerpts in his opinion in Morgan:
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of investment banking to the
national economy. The vast industrial growth of the past fifty years has covered the
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mits that these two considerations provide the actual basis for the
decision in Morgan as well as the basis for the Commission's dic-
tum in PSI about the applicability of section 1 of the Sherman Act
to the price fixing provisions of underwriting agreements.
An important corollary, however, exists to the Commission's
advocacy in PSI of governmental nonintervention in the fixed
price underwriting system. The Commission in PSI implicitly rec-
ognized that if the fixed price underwriting system requires quasi-
governmental enforcement mechanisms to continue functioning,
then the Commission's own assumption that the system was an ef-
ficient and necessary impediment to pure free markets could no
longer stand unchallenged. If the fixed price offering system were
the effective and efficient system its advocates claimed, the partici-
pants would adhere to it without quasi-governmental compulsion.
Thus, the Commission in PSI established the principle that while
the government should not dismantle the fixed price underwriting
system, it had to exist without government help, either directly or
indirectly through the NASD. Commissioner Healy and the other
Commissioners who approved the present day NASD antidiscount-
ing rules failed to perceive this subtlety.
In proffering these rules banning indirect discounting the
NASD in effect asked the Commission to make a drastic policy
shift that contradicted the long standing PSI principle. The rules
United States with a network of manufacturing, processing, sales and distributing
plants, the smooth functioning of which is vital to our welfare as a nation. They vary
from huge corporate structures such as the great steel and automobile companies, rail-
roads and airlines, producers of commodities and merchandise of all kinds, oil compa-
nies and public utilities, down to comparatively small manufacturing plants and stores.
The variety and usefulness of these myriad enterprises defy description. They are the
result of American ingenuity and the will to work unceasingly and to improve our stan-
dard of living. But adequate financing for their needs is the life blood without which
many if not most of these parts of the great machine of business would cease to func-
tion in a healthy, normal fashion.
The present method for issuing and distributing new security issues thus has its
roots in the latter part of the nineteenth century. It is the product of a gradual evolu-
tion to meet specific economic problems created by demands for capital, which arose as
the result of the increasing industrialization of the country and the growth of a widely
dispersed investor class. It was born in large part because of, and gradually adapted
itself to, conditions and needs which are peculiar to the business of raising capital.
The utility and reasonableness of the [fixed price offering system], and the fact
that functionally it serves a legitimate business and trade-promoting purpose, is amply
demonstrated by its unchallenged growth by a gradual process of evolution over a pe-
riod of a half-century, more or less.
Id. at 635-36, 689.
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sought to make the government an active-if indirect-participant
in preventing two sophisticated parties from freely bargaining with
each other. The NASD proposed, and the Commission eventually
accepted, the rules in the name of preserving the status quo of the
fixed price underwriting system. As one former Commissioner said,
"This nine-year dispute over the extent to which underwriters can
offer indirect or soft dollar discounts to institutional investors who
buy portions of new offerings ended by leaving the industry where
it was."1 8 The antidiscounting rules, however, were actually a
presciption for radical change. The true status quo was an under-
writing system that functioned without resort to the quasi-govern-
mental compulsion that the NASD antidiscounting rules add.13 9
Thus, the Commission should have placed on the NASD the bur-
dens of proof to justify the rule changes. The conclusory opinions
given by the NASD and its supporters with respect to the ill ef-
fects of a rejection of the new rules would not sustain those bur-
dens unless the opinions were intuitively obvious. This Article,
however, demonstrates that those opinions are not self-evident.
C. Possible Threats to the Capital Raising System Without the
New Rules
Supporters of the NASD ban on indirect discounting claimed
that a failure to implement the prohibition would lead to ill effects
that at best would increase the cost to issuers of raising capital and
at worst undermine the entire American capital raising system.40
Specifically, those in favor of the new NASD rules expressed con-
cern that small investors would desert the new issues markets14 1
138. R. KARMEL, supra note 116, at 135.
139. The NASD argued that its actions were private rather than quasi-governmental.
Commissioner Evans effectively rebutted this contention by pointing out that,
While it might be argued that the regulation is being imposed by the NASD and not by
the Commission, I find that distinction not to be meaningful in this context. I do not
mean to suggest, of course, that the NASD is an arm of the Federal Government. In-
deed it is not, but it does exercise quasi-governmental authority. Moreover, this propo-
sal would not be before the Commission if it could be implemented without our
approval.
Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,873 n. 1 (Evans, Comm'r, dissenting) (citations omit-
ted). Further, the Exchange Act explicitly authorizes the NASD to bar from membership, or
association with a member, persons who violate the NASD rules, including presumably the
antidiscounting rules. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g)(2) (1976). For an argument that the NASD
actions amount to state action in a variety of contexts, see Note, Governmental Action and
the National Association of Securities Dealers, 47 FoRDHAM L. RaV. 585 (1979).
140. See NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 17-25; SIA Comment Letter, supra
note 112, at 28-34.
141. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 34.
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and that investment bankers either would abandon the field be-
cause of decreased profitability or an inability to stabilize new of-
ferings, or would increase their charges to issuers, which would in-
crease the cost of raising needed capital."" Because of the general
lack of knowledge about the economics of the primary distribution
markets, one cannot merely postulate that these concerns are un-
founded; on the other hand, enough reasons exist for doubting the
basis for the concerns so that one cannot merely accept the con-
cerns as axiomatic as the Commission apparently did.
The thesis that indirect discounting will drive small investors
out of the market is based on the assumption that when small in-
vestors discover that institutional investors are receiving indirect
discounts in new issues offerings, the small investors will withhold
their participation in the offerings because of a sense of unfairness.
Empirical studies suggest that small investors in securities ex-
change transactions believe that they are the victims of discrimina-
tion in favor of large investors and that this belief might be a fac-
tor in nonparticipation in the securities markets.143 These studies,
however, indicate that the real issue for small investors is not that
others are paying more favorable rates of commission on securities
transactions, but that the brokers simply do not want the business
of small investors and, consequently, are not giving small investors
proper services or information."4 ' No empirical evidence exists that
small investors believe they are victims of price discrimination or
that this belief causes small investors to alter their investment be-
havior. The small investor abandonment argument underestimates
the degree to which most people accept quantity discounts as a
fact of life and business. Consumers in general recognize that a
person who buys a case of canned tomatoes pays a lower per unit
price than does the person who merely buys a single can.
The argument by the NASD that indirect discounting will re-
duce the profitability of underwriters has some merit. Indirect dis-
counting is a form of competition, and to the extent it is barred,
underwriters are better able to increase their return through di-
minished competition. The NASD conclusion, however, that the
decrease in profitability will lead investment bankers to cease un-
derwriting new issues should not be accepted readily. The NASD
142. Id. at 24-28.
143. See Branson, Securities Regulation After Entering the Competitive Era: The Se-
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in effect argued that indirect discounting must be prohibited to
maintain needed underwriting capacity. The argument that the
underwriting market requires relief from competition to assist in
maintaining capacity is not unique to the securities industry, and
scholars have questioned its validity.145 The preservation of capac-
ity argument is a classic plea made on behalf of horizontal price
fixing in general146 and as support for regulation of various indus-
tries.147 Whatever its validity in other contexts, the argument has
doubtful applicability in the underwriting area. First, the key in-
gredient supplied by underwriters is capital-the most fungible of
all goods. Thus, even if a system of free indirect discounting di-
minished profits to the point that, with the present level of de-
mand, a number of established firms left the field, reentry would
not be difficult when the demand for underwriting increased.
Moreover, operations within the securities industry historically
145. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIs, 324-25 (4th ed. 1981); S. BREYFR, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM 31 (1982); E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSH
260-63 (1982). Professor Areeda succinctly summarizes the general case against the
argument:
(1) It is not clear that capacity is truly in jeopardy. Not much "damage" could occur
during a short recession; even bankruptcy may involve a realignment of ownership in-
terests rather than a withdrawal from the industry. And businessmen often recognize
their long-run need for capacity and avoid pricing at the level of out-of-pocket costs for
prolonged periods. In any event, if it is truly cheaper to maintain currently unneeded
capacity rather than to retire and rebuild it, then businessmen would do just that even
without price-fixing. (2) There are few, if any, historical examples in which national
economic fluctuations were accompanied by wasteful alternation of scrapping and re-
building of an industry's capacity. (3) The need for industry adjustments, sometimes
masked by inflationary euphoria during boom periods, becomes obvious during reces-
sion and retrenchment. Relative prices remain important even in the course of a de-
pression. (4) We cannot easily identify the occasions when the argument justifies the
preservation of some capacity. A particular industry's problem might be chronic rather
than temporary even though its decline coincides with the onset of a national recession.
(5) The price fixed may be higher than necessary and may continue longer than war-
ranted. And there may be no suitable agency to make these decisions. The firms in-
volved may not be entirely motivated by the public interest.
P. AREEDA, supra, at 324-25.
146. P. AREEDA, supra note 145, at 329. A closely related argument is that free compe-
tition does not yield a sufficiently large rate of return to encourage firms to enter the field
and that firms, therefore, must be encouraged to enter the field through cartelization. See R.
KARMEL, supra note 116, at 304 (Commission approval of the antidiscounting rules properly
recognizes the importance of "maintaining underwriting as a profitable business").
147. E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, supra note 115, at 53-55, 260-63. Specifically, propo-
nents of minimum rate regulation traditionally have used this argument. Id. at 260-63. The
New York Stock Exchange in attempting to defend fixed minimum commission rates made
an interesting and particularly relevant argument along these lines. For rebuttals to the
Exchange contentions, see SEC Release, supra note 98, at 84,978-80; Baxter, supra note 100,
at 697-703; infra note 148.
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have a low ratio of fixed to total costs, 48 a characteristic that facil-
itates reentry in response to changes in demand.
Second, strong indications exist that even if some firms were
to leave underwriting, a number of other firms-regional broker-
dealers and discount broker-dealers-would be willing to take their
places. When the Commission initially solicited comments on the
new NASD rules, it received a number of written complaints from
regional broker-dealers charging that managing underwriters did
not allow the dealers to join in desirable underwritings and, thus,
that they could participate only through designated orders made
by institutions." 9 In addition, during the hearings on the proposed
rule changes a vice president of a major discount broker-dealer
concern testified that his firm would be willing to enter the under-
writing field. 50 The written comments and testimony of regional
and discount broker-dealers are not sufficient to prove that a
plethora of brokerage firms are waiting to enter the underwriting
arena should some of the present participants depart; decreased
profitability may diminish the desire of these firms to enter the
field. Nonetheless, the comments of the firms should have been
sufficient to prevent the Commission from accepting without ques-
tion the contention that continual indirect discounting will lead to
a shortage of underwriting capacity.
Reason exists also to doubt the assumption that indirect dis-
counting will destroy stabilization. The need for stabilization arises
when an active secondary market exists for a new issue of securi-
ties. The injection of a large block of new securities in theory may
have a depressing effect on the price of the securities trading in the
secondary market.' 5' If the price for the security in the secondary
market declines to a point below the price of the new issues, the
decline will jeopardize the distribution of the new issue because
buyers will prefer to buy the security at the lower secondary mar-
ket price. To prevent this effect, the underwriters of a new issue
enter bids for the securities at the public offering price for the new
148. See R. WEST & S. TINIC, supra note 100, at 123-34; Mann, The New York Stock
Exchange: A Cartel at the End of Its Reign, in PROMOTING CoMPETTIION IN REGULATED
MARKETS 306-12 (A. Phillips, ed. 1975).
149. See Practices Release, supra note 26, at 81,770 nn.69-71.
150. Hearings Transcript, supra note 231, at 690-92 (testimony of R.W. Arnold, vice-
president, Finance, Charles Schuab & Co., Inc.); see also Blotnick, Discount Brokers and
New Issues, FORBES, July 21, 1980, at 90-91 (suggesting that other discount brokers may be
interested in becoming involved in underwriting.
151. See Pegging, Fixing and Stabilizing Security Prices, SEC Release No. 34-2446, 2
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,513-22,547, at 22,531 (Mar. 18, 1940).
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issue and purchase securities coming into the secondary market.15
The NASD and the other supporters of the new antidiscounting
rules argued that if indirect discounting were allowed, institutional
investors would receive their indirect discounts, and make an "in-
stant profit" by selling the securities into the stabilizing bid of the
underwriters, bankrupt the underwriter's stabilization fund, and
destroy the offering.15s Again, no hard data exists on how often this
activity currently occurs. In fact, institutions receiving indirect dis-
counts have a desire to continue receiving discounts, which is a
motive to avoid selling the indirectly discounted securities into the
stabilizing bid. If investors continually undermined stabilizing ef-
forts, underwriters would no longer be able to offer indirect dis-
counts regardless of the bargaining power an institutional investor
may have.15 4 To participate in underwritings in which arbitrage
continually breaks stabilizing bids is to invite financial catastro-
phe-through absorption of unsalable securities-an outcome no
underwriter could tolerate even in the face of the strongest institu-
tional pressure. Moreover, underwriters might stabilize an offering
at the net price paid by selling group members and, thus, eliminate
the profitability of selling indirectly discounted securities into the
stabilizing bid.1
55
Last, the NASD contended that because indirect discounting
would lower profit margins, underwriters would be forced to raise
the cost of their service to issuers, which would increase the cost of
raising capital.15 6 Fierce competition, however, exists among bro-
ker-dealers who wish to act as underwriters. 57 Thus, underwriters
may find that to increase their profits by lowering the amount paid
to issuers would be impossible. This competition for issuers' busi-
ness may apply only to those firms who wish to sell desirable low
risk securities. If this theory is correct, issuers of riskier securities
may in fact be forced to pay higher costs for raising capital if indi-
152. See id. 1 22,523.
153. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 25-26.
154. Indeed, the NASD premised its entire argument about stabilization on the notion
that stabilization is essential and that a lack of an ability to stabilize successfully would lead
to financial disaster for underwriters.
155. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,867 n.106.
156. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 24.
157. See Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 55,207 (testimony of W. H. Ham-
brecht, partner, Hambrecht & Quist and R. A. Powers, chairman and chief executive officer,
Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc.); SIA Comment Letter, supra note 112, at 16-17.
But see, Logue & Rogalski, Does It Pay to Shop for Your Bond Underwriter?, HARv. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1979, at 111, 112-16 (suggesting that major Wall Street underwriters do not
compete on price in debt offerings).
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rect discounting is allowed, but only if one assumes that invest-
ment bankers do use or will use the profits they receive from more
desirable offerings to lower costs on riskier offerings. This assump-
tion may not be accurate. 158 In addition, the notion that issuers of
less risky securities should pay supra-competitive capital raising
costs to afford issuers of risky securities an opportunity to pay
lower costs is a cross-subsidization argument that suffers from the
same weaknesses as all such arguments." 9
In summary, current knowledge of the securities markets
neither proves nor disproves the claims of the NASD about the
impact of continued indirect discounting on capital raising. In ad-
dition, those claims are not sufficiently evident that the Commis-
sion should have accepted them on faith. The Commission, how-
ever, made precisely that mistake in approving the NASD
antidiscounting rules.
IV. PROTECTING THE COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE OF THE
INVESTMENT BANKING INDUSTRY
The basic theme of the arguments made on behalf of the
NASD antidiscounting rules is that the utility of the rules in fur-
thering the purposes of the Exchange Act outweighs their obvious
anticompetitive impact. The NASD and other supporters of the
rules, when they insisted that failure to adopt antidiscounting
rules would lead to a decrease in the number of investment bank-
ing firms and an increase in concentration in the industry, ob-
liquely argued that the rules are, on balance, procompetitive.160 In
a recent article Mr. George Brunelle develops that argument with
more detail and sophistication than did the NASD.161 Mr. Brunelle
contends that in considering the competitive impact of the rules
banning indirect discounting, the Commission was obligated to ad-
here to the spirit, if not the letter, of all antitrust laws, including
the Robinson-Patman Act. He notes that the type of indirect dis-
counting barred by the NASD rules amounts to price discrimina-
tion that would violate the Robinson-Patman Act if that statute
158. See S. RoBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS 172-75 (1966) (suggesting that older,
"established" underwriters tend to avoid backing new ventures and unseasoned companies).
Professor Robbins bases his conclusion upon data gathered in the late 1950's and early
1960's. Therefore, one must utilize the data with caution.
159. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
160. See R. KARMEL, supra note 116, at 134; SIA Comment Letter, supra note 112, at
35.
161. See Brunelle, supra note 61.
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applied to securities transactions.1 6 2 Mr. Brunelle then argues that
this price discrimination will exacerbate the already existing trends
toward a decreased number of participants in the underwriting
field and an increased concentration in the investment banking
industry.163
Numerous weaknesses exist in Mr. Brunelle's defense of the
NASD antidiscounting rules. He assumes that in requiring the
Commission to consider the competitive impact of the rules of the
NASD and the other self-regulatory organizations, Congress in-
tended that the Commission utilize some of the substantive stan-
dards of the Robinson-Patman Act. Although the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, as part of the Clayton Act, embodies procompetitive
purposes such as the prohibition of predatory pricing, it also em-
bodies values that are anticompetitive. These anticompetitive val-
ues make the Act more a small-or inefficient-business relief act
than a competition fostering act. In recent years scholars and prac-
titioners from across the antitrust and political spectrums have
criticized the Robinson-Patman Act, not only because they view it
as promoting inefficiency, but because they see the Act as encour-
aging anticompetitive price rigidity, price fixing efforts, and oligo-
polistic behavior."" The assumption, therefore, that the NASD an-
tidiscounting rules further competition by promoting the values of
the Robinson-Patman Act rests on an extremely questionable
foundation.
Assuming, however, that the Robinson-Patman Act values are
relevant, serious weaknesses still exist in the contention that the
NASD rules actually foster competition. No clear explanation dem-
onstrates how price discrimination through indirect discounting
will lead to decreased competition; no competitive injury will occur
to investors because institutional and individual investors are not
in competition. Moreover, indirect discounting should not injure
competition among underwriters. Price discrimination is harmful
to competition only if it becomes predatory pricing.115 No indica-
162. At least one court has held that the Robinson-Patman Act does not cover trans-
actions in securities. Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs., 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969).
163. Brunelle, supra note 61, at 73-76.
164. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRusT PARADox 384-85 (1978); F. SCHERER, INDUS-
TRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANcE 580-82 (2d ed. 1980). In Profes-
sor-now Judge-Bork's colorful phrase, "[T]he scholarly and professional literature on the
[Robinson-Patman Act] resembles a cascade of vituperation." Id. at 385.
For a concise summary of the case against the Robinson-Patman Act, see ABA Mono-
graph, supra note 27, at 27-37.
165. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 79, at 682; Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of
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tion, however, exists that the present practice of indirect discount-
ing in new issue underwriting amounts to predatory pricing. Oppo-
nents of discounting have proffered no evidence that the indirect
discounters have been giving discounts sufficient to price the secur-
ities below average variable cost, marginal cost, total cost, or any
other cost-based standard. In addition, no evidence exists that the
indirect discounters have been giving discounts with the desire-or
even knowledge-that the discounts will drive their competitors
out of business. As one witness testifying on behalf of the antidis-
counting rules stated during the hearings, "[W]hen these [indirect]
discounts do occur, they more often occur on the part of someone
who is willing to accept less profit for whatever the reason. ' 166
Mr. Brunelle's argument also rests on another questionable as-
sumption-that the decreasing number of firms in the securities
industry indicates that the industry is becoming less competitive.
A number of antitrust scholars have noted that neither a decrease
in the number of competitors nor an increase in an industry's con-
centration necessarily means that the industry is becoming a mo-
nopoly or an oligopoly.16 7 In the securities industry indications are
that the industry remains competitive despite the decrease in the
number of firms that occurred after the abolition of fixed rates of
commissions on securities exchanges. SEC Chairman John R. Shad
recently testified before a House of Representative subcommittee
that the large number of firms still in the securities business and
the above average returns on equity of smaller regional firms point
to the continued competitive nature of that industry.
168
No evidence links indirect discounting to decreased competi-
tion. In fact, evidence suggests that indirect discounting has made
the underwriting field more competitive. One commentator charac-
terizes the underwriting industry as "a tight club-like frater-
nity. '169 "Caste-like" would be a more accurate description. Under-
Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 VAN. L. REv. 63, 66-83 (1982).
166. Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 55 (testimony of J. Hambrecht).
167. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 4 ANITRUST LAW I 910b, at 54-55, 1 910c, at
56-57 (1980).
168. [Jan-June] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. ., at A-5 (June 24, 1981). The most
thorough treatment of the competitive effects of the merger trend in the securities industry
is Schneider, Evolving Proof Standards Under Section 7 and Mergers in Transitional Mar-
kets: The Securities Industry Example, 1981 Wis. L. REv.. 1. Mr. Schneider, a former Jus-
tice Department Antitrust Division official and current SEC official, concludes that the se-
curities industry is becoming more competitive despite the merger trend. Id. at 95-96.
169. C. WELLES, supra note 13, at 70.
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writing firms are grouped in hierarchical "brackets"'170 that often
are based on historical relationships and past forms of reciprocal
dealing rather than on ability to manage, sell, or capitalize under-
writings. These brackets frequently determine whether, and per-
haps more importantly, to what extent, a broker-dealer will permit
an underwriter to participate in an underwriting.171 In commenting
on the NASD rules, several broker-dealers noted that indirect dis-
counting-particularly designated orders-frequently allows bro-
ker-dealers to obtain a share larger than its bracket normally
would dictate of a desirable underwriting. 17 2 Thus, indirect dis-
counting may lead to a dismantling of the underwriting bracket
system and make the industry more competitive rather than less
competitive.
Finally, Mr. Brunelle's conclusion that indirect discounting
will lead to increased concentration in the underwriting field is
challenged by evidence that the usual conditions conducive to de-
structive competition and dominance by a few large firms are not
present in the securities industry. Specifically, the data developed
in the debate over fixed commission rates on exchanges indicates
that the securities industry is not characterized by high fixed cost
to variable cost ratios or by large economies of scale. 7 3 The ab-
sence of these characteristics makes it unlikely that free competi-
tion in the industry automatically will turn destructive and lead to
,the creation of a monopoly or oligopoly. 74
Mr. Brunelle's argument that the NASD antidiscounting rules
are procompetitive is not new. The argument is the same as those
advanced for the proposition that price fixing among competitors
increases competition;'7 they are also the same arguments ad-
170. Schneider, supra note 168, at 65-66.
171. Hayes, Investment Banking: Power Structure in Flux, 49 HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1971, at 141.
172. See Practices Release, supra note 26, at 81,770.
173. See supra note 142.
174. Id.
175. See P. AREEDA, supra note 145, at 322-28; Posner & Easterbrook, supra note 79,
at 115. In addition to the arguments discussed in the text of this Article, Mr. Brunelle also
contends that the antidiscounting rules are needed to supply countervailing power to pro-
tect the competitive structure of the securities industry against the power of institutional
investors. Brunelle, supra note 61, at 76-77. This argument, which customarily is made on
behalf of price fixing among competitors, has been discredited by scholars of all antitrust
persuasions. See P. AREEDA, supra note 145, at 327-28; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 79, at 204;
Posner & Easterbrook, supra note 79, at 115. As Professor Sullivan points out,
if there is excess market power at any level, the public is not likely to be benefited by
allowing those at other levels of the chain to act concertedly. The result will likely be a
battle or a concord between the giants about how the spoils from excess market power
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vanced in opposition to deregulation of industries such as truck-
ing. 76 Courts have rejected these arguments and, antitrust scholars
have given them no support.177 One defensibly can argue as did
Ray Garrett, Jr., on behalf of the NASD that the forces of compe-
tition in the underwriting field produce inequitable results and
that these forces, therefore, should be restrained. 7 8 One, however,
should not claim that these restraints in fact foster competition.
Thus, while the Commission may have been incorrect in approving
the NASD rules, it was correct in not relying on arguments that
the rules were in fact procompetitive.
VII. COMMISSION-ORDERED MODIFICATION OF THE RULES-A
STUDY IN UNPRINCIPLED DECISIONMAKING
The Commission did not approve the NASD antidiscounting
rules until after the NASD adopted two major modifications in-
sisted upon by the Commission. The first modification, which al-
ters the definition of overtrades to bring more swap transactions
within the prohibition against overtrading, 179 comports with the
various justifications for the antidiscounting rules. The second
modification, however, which permits the provision of research to
be considered as services in distribution, 80 in effect allows contin-
ued indirect discounting through designated orders in return for
research' 8' and is inconsistent with all of the justifications ad-
vanced on behalf of the new rules. Allowing the use of research as a
form of indirect discount in the absence of a formal disclosure re-
quirement is inconsistent totally with the notion that this dis-
counting renders misleading the price disclosure in the statutorily
required prospectus. In addition, the modification is inconsistent
are to be shared; it would be better for the public that those segments displaying a
competitive structure be maintained that way, and that ways be found to reduce power
at the other level.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 79, at 204.
176. See, e.g., American Trucking Association, Should the Present Regulatory System
of the Trucking Industry Be Fundamentally Changed: Con, 58 CONG. DIG. 235, 245 (1979)
(making explicit analogy to concentration in the securities industry); Brock, The Pros and
Cons of Deregulating the Truckers, FORTUNE, June 18, 1979, at 142.
177. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982); Cat-
alano v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curium); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); P. AREEDA, supra note 145, at 322-28; L. SULLIVAN, supra note
79, at 203-04; Posner & Easterbrook, supra note 79, at 113-16.
178. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
179. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,853-54.
180. Id. at 83,857-58.
181. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 583, at A-2 (Dec. 17, 1980).
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with the NASD equity argument because small investors will not
be able to receive free research in return for purchasing new issues
of securities.
One could argue that the modification is not inconsistent with
the goals of preservation of the capital raising system and competi-
tive industry structure, and that, with the limits on demand for
research by institutional investors, the research loophole will allow
relatively little indirect discounting. The reactions of institutional
investors to the NASD rules as originally proposed, testimony pro-
vided at the public hearings on the antidiscounting rules, and past
experience with respect to the evasion of the old exchange fixed
commission rates, however, strongly suggest that designated orders
in return for research is the largest single form of indirect dis-
counting in new issue underwriting. 18 2 If this suggestion is correct,
then a significant amount of indirect discounting may still occur
that, according to the supporters of the antidiscounting rules, will
have the above-mentioned deleterious effects on the underwriting
industry. Thus, the Commission's modification in favor of research
is inconsistent with all the articulated justifications for the new
rules and casts serious doubt on whether the Commission relied in
its approval on any of the rationales advanced on behalf of the
proposed rules.
The Commission in fact made a political compromise. The
NASD and the securities industry strongly desired the antidis-
counting rules; on the other hand, the proposed ban on designated
orders in return for research disturbed institutional investors.
18
3
The Commission's modification and ultimate approval of the rules
gave the NASD most of the antidiscounting rules it sought, yet
allowed institutional investors to continue utilizing designated or-
ders in return for research. The spirit of compromise, however,
does not render the rules consistent with the Exchange Act. As this
Article has discussed, the antidiscounting rules impose obvious and
acknowledged burdens on competition.1 84 The Exchange Act allows
the imposition of these burdens only when they are necessary to
further the purposes of the Act. 85 The NASD and the other sup-
182. See, e.g., C. WELLES, supra note 13, at 69; Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at
276 (testimony of W. Williams); Letter of Comment from Prudential Insurance Co. to
George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC, File No. SR-NASD-78-3 at 8-9, (Aug. 1, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Prudential Comment].
183. See, e.g., Prudential Comment, supra note 182, at 8-9.
184. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 44.
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porters of the antidiscounting rules posited a number of purposes
they believed the rules would serve. In approving the antidiscount-
ing rules, the Commission purportedly relied upon one of these
purposes-the preservation of the fixed price offering system-to
justify the anticompetitive aspects of the new rules. The Commis-
sion's insistence on allowing indirect discounting through the pro-
vision of research, however, indicates that the Commission gave no
real credence to its stated justification for approving the rules.
Thus, the Commission knowingly approved a set of anticompeti-
tive rules that had no proven justification for furthering the pur-
poses of the Exchange Act. In addition to being contrary to the
mandates of the Exchange Act, this action was an exercise in un-
principled decisionmaking.
VIII. THE FUTURE OF THE ANTIDISCOUNTING RULES-WHAT IS
THE HARM?
The new NASD rules possibly will have little long-term effect.
The fixed price underwriting system is under tremendous pres-
sure.186 As the NASD pointed out, the antidiscounting rules do not
mandate fixed price offerings on the part of underwriters; they
merely require adherence to the resale price maintenance terms
once a fixed price underwriting is utilized. 18 7 Thus, if fixed price
offerings are inefficient, the antidiscounting rules in the long run
will not preserve the system from the pressures of institutional
investors.
Significant questions also exist about how efficacious the new
antidiscounting rules will be in the short run because the rules may
be unenforceable. A broker-dealer-particularly a large firm-
supplies a myriad of investment services to institutional investors.
If a broker-dealer wishes to give an indirect discount to a favored
institutional customer, the broker-dealer simply can decrease the
price of one of the other services it supplies to the institutional
investor. No agreement need be in writing; a tacit understanding is
sufficient.188 This discounting is undetectable unless the NASD
manages to establish a fair market value for every product or ser-
vice that a broker-dealer supplies to institutional customers. The
186. See Hayes, The Transformation of Investment Banking, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-
Feb. 1979, at 153; SIA Comment Letter, supra note 112, at 13-22.
187. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 23.
188. See Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 306-07 (testimony of S. Bernstein)
(tacit understandings already exist in the industry about rewarding through underwritings
firms that supply research to institutional investors).
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area of reciprocal dealings offers other fruitful possibilities for
evading the antidiscounting rules. For example, an insurance com-
pany may purchase securities in a fixed price public offering from a
particular underwriter at the public offering price. To obtain the
insurance company's business, the broker-dealer may purchase
"key man" life insurance for some of its executives from that com-
pany. Thus, the insurance company obtains an indirect discount
that cannot be detected. This example is not extraordinary; bro-
ker-dealers utilized precisely this type of reciprocity to evade fixed
commission rates on exchanges.1 89 Indeed, the NASD admitted
during the hearings that discounts granted through reciprocal deal-
ings and services would be virtually undetectable. 190 Thus, any
firm wishing to evade the antidiscounting rules could do so with
practically no threat of detection or punishment.19
If the NASD rules, then, will have little practical effect, one
may ask "what is the harm in the rules?" First, although the rules
are not likely to prevent the decline of the fixed price system, they
may delay its natural demise. If only quasi-governmental authority
can preserve the fixed price underwriting system, then the system
is little more than a price fixing cartel, and, like all cartels, is likely
to crumble under competitive pressures. Commentators long have
recognized that cheating by cartel members is a key factor in the
dissolution of cartels. 92 Although limited, the ability of the NASD
to detect indirect discounting is distinctly superior to the ability of
individual syndicate members to detect cheating. According to the
NASD, the modern clearing and settlement system makes the de-
tection capacity of individual syndicate members nonexistent. '
The NASD at least has some hope of detecting indirect discount-
ing because of the right of the NASD to inspect its members'
189. See C. WELLES, supra note 13, at 69-70.
190. Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at 98 (testimony of R. Garrett, Jr.).
191. In reply to this point the NASD maintained that as "law-abiding citizens" its
members and institutional investors would obey the antidiscounting rules. NASD Comment
Letter, supra note 22, at 51 & n.40. The NASD did not explain why many of these same
"law-abiding citizens" were willing to flaunt exchange rules in the era of fixed commission
rates on securities exchanges by granting indirect discounts. Nor did the NASD explain why
institutional investors would be any less willing than they were in the era of fixed exchange
commission rates to press for discounts. Indeed, witnesses for the NASD stated that today's
institutional investors are more performance conscious than ever and negotiate strongly for
the best possible deal in every transaction. See, e.g., Hearings Transcript, supra note 21, at
105 (testimony of J.S. Putnam).
192. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 164, at 172-73; ABA Monograph, supra note 87,
at 29.
193. See NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 17-18.
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books."' To the extent that the NASD can detect "cheat-
ing"-indirect discounting in underwriting agreements-the decay
of the fixed price underwriting system may be delayed, even if not
prevented.
Second, the Commission, which commentators generally re-
gard as one of the best federal administrative agencies, 195 ignored
and misread its controlling statute and then approved a rule on the
basis of questionable evidence. More importantly, the Commission
changed its attitude with respect to the role of the government in
enforcing anticompetitive agreements. By approving the NASD an-
tidiscounting rules the Commission has reversed a sensible policy
of thirty-five years standing and has lent the weight of quasi-gov-
ernmental enforcement to a practice with anticompetitive effects.
The Commission in the process uncritically accepted the outworn
arguments traditionally advanced on behalf of government regula-
tion and price fixing. The SEC in effect has allowed the reregula-
tion of underwriting.
The Commission's actions not only are inconsistent with
movements to deregulate other industries, but also are contrary to
the Commission's own goal of attempting to increase competition
in the securities industry. 98 The Commission's approval of the
NASD rules may not affect the nature of the underwriting field,
especially over the long period. Nonetheless, the approval may
send precisely the wrong signal to the underwriting community.
The underwriting industry sees itself-perhaps quite accu-
rately-as an industry "beset" by competition. In addition to the
bargaining power of institutional investors, underwriters face the
possibilities of new methods of raising capital and new actors in
the underwriting field. For example, at least one major corpora-
tion-utilizing a "Dutch Auction"'197 -recently raised capital di-
rectly without benefit of underwriters. 98
194. Id.
195. Ratner, supra note 94, at 14.
196. The best examples of the Commission's efforts to increase competition in the se-
curities industry are its abolition of fixed commission rates on securities exchanges, see Abo-
lition of Fixed Commission Rates Release, supra note 98, and its efforts to remove off-board
trading restrictions on securities exchanges, see Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange
Act Release No. 16,888, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,608 (June 11,
1980) (adoption of rule 19c-3).
197. A "Dutch Auction" is a process in which an issuer raises capital by selling its
securities through competitive bidding to any purchaser, whether an investment banker or
not. BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 13, 1976, at 148.
198. See SIA Comment Letter, supra note 58, at 20.
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Securities Act rule 415,199 recently promulgated and reenacted
on a temporary basis, perhaps poses a more significant threat than
new capital raising methods. Rule 415 allows an issuer to use shelf
registration to sell its securities "on a nonfixed price basis over
time depending on market conditions. 2 0 0 The rule also allows issu-
ers to sell 'securities registered on the shelf in a succession of dif-
ferent kinds of offerings." 01 The underwriting industry has ob-
jected to rule 415 on the ground that the rule will encourage
issuers to deal directly with institutional investors and, thus, de-
stroy the fixed price offering system and the underwriting indus-
try.20 2 Rule 415 may signify to the underwriting industry the mate-
rialization of its worst fears-that institutional investors will
establish direct links with firms seeking to raise capital and that
institutions such as commercial banks will enter into direct compe-
tition with existing underwriters.
Underwriters, instead of increasing efficiency and service, may
seek to meet the competitive challenge with governmental action
led by the Commission. The hope that the Commission will at-
tempt to stop the competitive processes undermining the position
of the existing underwriting firms may be unrealistic. The promul-
gation of rule 415 and the Commission's recent support for amend-
ing the Glass-Steagall Act to allow banks to underwrite industrial
revenue bonds and to allow bank holding companies to own
brokerage firms 20 3 indicate that the Commission is unwilling to
199. Securities Act Rule 415, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 3383 (1982).
200. Examination of Registration of Securities to be Offered and Sold on a Delayed or
Continuous Basis in the Future, Securities Act Release No. 6391, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,108, at 84,936 (Mar. 12, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Rule 415 Release].
201. Id.
202. See SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 532-33 (Mar. 24, 1982).
203. The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48
Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Particularly relevant to
the discussion in this Article are § 21 of the Act, which makes it a felony for a bank to
engage "in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or re-
tail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securi-
ties," 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1976), and § 20 of the Act, which prohibits any member bank of the
Federal Reserve System from being affiliated "with any corporation, association, business
trust, or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, floatation, underwriting,
public sale, or distribution" of securities. Id. § 377.
Over the past two decades banks and members of the securities industry have been
engaged in a variety of battles about whether particular bank activities violate the Act and
whether Congress should amend the Act to permit more extensive bank involvement in the
securities business. For a brief history of some of these battles, see Clark & Saunders, Glass-
Steagall Revised: The Impact on Banks, Capital Markets, and the Small Investor, 97
BANKING L.J. 811 (1980); Clark & Saunders, Judicial Interpretation of Glass-Steagall: The
[Vol. 36:9
NASD RULES
stop completely the competitive erosion of the underwriting indus-
try.210 On the other hand, the Commission's actions in these areas
indicate that it may not be averse to slowing the competitive chal-
lenge. For example, the Commission adopted and repromulgated
rule 415 only on a temporary basis and has held public hearings in
which it considered the impact of the rule on the fixed price sys-
tem and underwriters.205
Perhaps an even more significant indicia of the Commission's
ambivalent attitude toward free competition in the securities in-
dustry and rule 415 is subsection (a)(3) of that rule. Subsection
(a)(3) requires that an offering made at the market-one made at
whatever the market is willing to pay rather than at a fixed
price-be made with an underwriter. 208 This provision has the ef-
fect of protecting underwriters from the competition of issuers who
attempt to retail securities directly and eliminate the middleman.
In a comment letter the Justice Department called the provision
"little more than an 'underwriter relief act.' ,207
In addition, the Commission has voiced support for requiring
banks to compete through affiliates rather than allowing them to
engage directly in underwriting.208 Considerations other than a de-
sire to shield investment bankers from competition may motivate
the Commission's stance on these issues.2 0 9 Nonetheless, the Com-
mission's actions in these areas and its uncritical approval of the
NASD antidiscounting rules at least implies that the Commission
is pursuing a policy designed to slow the competitive processes
that are eroding the economic position of investment bankers.
Last, the Commission's approval of the antidiscounting rules
casts doubt upon its willingness to evaluate and abrogate other
NASD rules that are anticompetitive. A prime example is the
NASD mark-up policy, which prohibits a member acting in its ca-
pacity as a dealer or principal from charging a price for securities
Need for Legislative Action, 97 BANKING L.J. 721 (1980).
204. SEc. REG. & L. RaP. (BNA) No. 6, at 251 (Feb. 10, 1982) (testimony of Chairman
John S.R. Shad before the Senate Committee on .Banking, Feb. 4, 1982).
205. Rule 415 Release, supra note 200, at 84,936.
206. Securities Act Rule 415(a)(3), supra note 199.
207. 14 SEC RaG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1099 (June 18, 1982).
208. See supra note 204.
209. For example, Chairman Shad of the SEC has expressed concerns that banks
would be exempt from antifraud rules under some of the proposals allowing them to com-
pete directly with investment bankers. See supra note 204. In announcing hearings on Rule
415, the Commission raised questions whether disclosure to investors would be adequate
under the rule. Rule 415 Release, supra note 200, at 84,936.
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that is not reasonably related to the current market price.21 0 The
NASD generally has interpreted an unreasonable price to be a
price greater than five percent over market price.2 11 The policy is a
form of price control, and if it were not immune from antitrust
scrutiny under the Exchange Act, it would constitute a per se vio-
lation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 12
The NASD possibly could justify the mark-up policy despite
its anticompetitive aspects as a reasonable regulation designed to
protect buyers and sellers of securities from fraud and overreach-
ing by securities dealers. A brief review of the origins of the policy,
however, reveals that the motivation for the policy was not the
protection of consumers, but the avoidance of competition among
securities dealers. In 1942 the Commission published for comment
a rule that would have required dealers acting as principals in
over-the-counter trading transactions to disclose to their customers
the "inside market price" of the securities that the customers were
buying or selling.213 The Commission defined the "inside market
price" as the best current independent bid and asking price for the
security. 2 4 This pricing information would allow a customer to as-
certain easily the amount of the markup-in the case of a cus-
tomer purchase-or markdown-in the case of a customer
sale-being charged in the transaction. The NASD and the securi-
ties industry vigorously opposed the proposed rule. To forestall
adoption of the proposed SEC disclosure rule the NASD presented
its mark-up policy.21 5 The NASD, therefore, developed the mark-
up policy not as a consumer protection mechanism, but as a device
to block a rule that both would have protected the consumer and
would have enhanced competition among securities dealers. Thus,
210. Interpretation of the NASD Board of Governors, after art. III § 3 of the NASD
Rules of Fair Practice reprinted in NASD MAN. (CCH) 1 2154 at 2054-58.
211. Id. at 623.
212. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (fixing of maximum prices
held to be per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act); United States v. National Ass'n of
Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950) (fixing of standardized commission rates by real estate
board held to be per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act). The SEC's oversight and
approval of the NASD's mark-up policy would seem to render it immune from antitrust
attack under the principles enunciated in United States v. National Ass'n of Securities
Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1974). See supra note 24.
213. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 646 (1963).
214. Id.
215. Id.; see Ratner, Regulation of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 348, 370 (1970).
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the NASD mark-up policy arguably should be a prime candidate
for abrogation by the Commission on the ground that the policy
places an unnecessary burden on competition. The NASD recog-
nized that its mark-up policy and several other of its rules21 were
anticompetitive and that Commission disapproval of the antidis-
counting rules would threaten disapproval of those other rules. 17
The uncritical approval by the Commission of the antidiscounting
rules, however, now may signal a lack of commitment to take ac-
tion against other self-regulatory organization rules, such as the
mark-up policy, that unnecessarily restrict the competitive process.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Commission still may rectify its error in approving the
NASD antidiscounting rules. Section 19(c) of the Exchange Act
gives the Commission the power to abrogate, add to, or delete from
the rules of self-regulatory organizations..2 "  The Commission
should begin proceedings pursuant to section 19(c) of the Ex-
change Act to abrogate the NASD new antidiscounting rules.
If the Commission were to take this step, the NASD probably
would argue that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the at-
tempts by the Commission to abrogate the antidiscounting rules.
The Supreme Court in recent years has retreated from the tradi-
tional rule that res judicata principles do not apply to administra-
tive actions,219 and the NASD could argue that the Commission's
previous finding that the rules were consistent with the Exchange
Act bars the Commission from subsequently finding that the rules
are inconsistent with the Exchange Act. Nonetheless, two reasons
exist why the doctrine is inapplicable to any reconsideration by the
Commission of the antidiscounting rules. First, section 19(c) of the
Exchange Act implicitly authorizes reconsideration of previously
approved self-regulatory organization rules. Second, courts gener-
ally have confined res judicata principles in administrative pro-
ceedings to agency decisions clearly resembling judicial actions
216. The other rules cited by the NASD were its rule limiting the amount of under-
writing fees members can charge issuers, Interpretation of the Board of Governors-Review
of Corporate Financing, following NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 1, reprinted in
NASD MAN. (CCH) 2151 at 2019-33, and its rule prohibiting reciprocal dealings in the sale
of investment company securities. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 26(1)(3), re-
printed in NASD MAN. (CCH) 2176 at 2106.
217. NASD Comment Letter, supra note 22, at 38-43.
218. 15 U.S.C. § 8s(c) (1976).
219. See W. GELHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COM-
MENTS 401 (7th ed. 1979).
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that are based on past facts and involve the award of money.220 In
contrast, when "the prior determination involves distinctively ad-
ministrative action in which public interest considerations
predominate," courts have not strictly applied the doctrine of res
judicata.221 Any Commission reconsideration of the new NASD an-
tidiscounting rules likely would fall into the latter category.
The Commission could overcome any estoppel or res judicata
problem since in its approval of the antidiscounting rules the Com-
mission left open the possibility of reexamination. In the release
approving the rules, the Commission indicated that it would reex-
amine the rules for difficulties with the fair and effective enforce-
ment of the rules.222 Given the motivation for and ease of evading
the rules, the Commission readily could find instances suggesting
that the rules are unenforceable. Thus, the enforcement problem
could be a justification for abrogating the rules.
The proceedings incident to the abrogation of the antidis-
counting rules would furnish an opportunity for supporters of the
rules to present the empirical evidence that was lacking in the ini-
tial approval proceedings. If supporters cannot present this evi-
dence, the Commission should abrogate the rules. If the NASD and
its supporters can prove that the absence of antidiscounting rules
will threaten the existence of the fixed price underwriting system,
then the Commission must face a more complex and troubling
question-whether a capital raising system dependent on quasi-
governmental compulsion to coerce its members to adhere to the
system is worth preserving. The Commission clearly had no desire
to address that issue in discussions of the NASD antidiscounting
rules. If the fixed price system cannot be preserved without resort
to NASD authority, however, then the Commission must consider
directly whether that system is both sustainable and desirable. The
Commission must undertake this evaluation not only to consider
intelligently the problem of indirect discounting, but also to shape
properly its role in assuring that the capital raising system of the
United States functions in the most efficient manner possible.
220. Id. at 402 (citing International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers v. Eagle-
Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335 (1945)).
221. Id. (citing Bourough of Lansdale, Pa. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941)).
222. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 83,860.
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